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Bermann: The European Intergovernmental Conference: An American Perspectiv

THE EUROPEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL
CONFERENCE: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
George A. Bermann*
Peter Herzog's career-long interest in the European Communities
makes it especially appropriate to include in this festschrift a contribution on what has become the principal mechanism for reforming the
treaties that constitute those Communities. I refer of course to the "intergovernmental conferences," or "IGCs" for short. As this festschrift
goes to press, the fifteen Member States are submitting the results of the
latest IGC-the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam 1-to their respective national ratification processes.
As its name suggests, the intergovernmental conference is a gathering of representatives of the Member States to discuss and eventually
agree upon amendments to the constitutive treaties as they then stand.
The EC Treaty, by its own terms, requires that all treaty amendments be
prepared by such an intergovernmental conference and be submitted to
the Member States for their separate ratification, 2 and the Treaty on European Union (the TEU or Maastricht Treaty) contains a parallel provision. 3 In point of fact, the recent Amsterdam Treaty is little more than a
set of amendments to the EC Treaty and the TEU.
Recent intergovernmental conferences have been followed with intense interest in European circles, as indeed they should be, for they
represent a kind of periodic constitutional convention. At a minimum,
they are the means by which the Member States adapt the treaties that
constitute the European Communities, and now the European Union as
well, to the needs of the future.
Depending on its programmatic content, a European IGC can also
generate considerable political and economic interest abroad. The IGC
that led up to adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 (including
certain amendments to the then-EEC Treaty) was dominated by a legis*

Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
2. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY art. 236, 1992 0.J. (C 224) 1, [1992)
1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
3. TREATY ON EuROPEAN UNION art. N, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, [1992) 1
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, in addition to introducing amendments to the EC
TREATY and the other Community treaties, established a European Union (of which the EC was to
form a part) and authorized the conduct of important intergovernmental activities (notably in the
foreign and security policy area and in justice and home affairs) in the name of the EU.
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lative program for completion of the so-called internal market; it accordingly generated fears in the United States of a "fortress Europe." The
IGCs that in tum produced the Maastricht Treaty dealt in large measure
with a blueprint for the construction of an economic and monetary union
(EMU), consisting of a single currency and a system of central banks
authorized to determine macro-economic policies for most if not all of
the EU' s Member States; the prospect of an EMU likewise entailed a
certain threat to American interests and accordingly earned serious attention in this country. But, as the most recent conference demonstrates,
IGCs do not necessarily have so strongly political a transatlantic dimension. While the EU' s eastern enlargement, which cast a long shadow
over the 1996 IGC, will obviously have repercussions outside Europe,
the latest IGC was viewed very largely as a "European" affair.
Whatever their significance for the transatlantic relationship may
be, the European IGCs invariably also hold interest from a comparative
constitutional law perspective. Judged in these terms, the IGC is a
highly curious phenomenon. This article seeks to sketch what appear to
be the most salient characteristics of the intergovernmental conference
as a general instrument of constitutional reform. In so doing, it also
examines the fruits of the latest intergovernmental conference-the IGC
that opened in Turin, Italy, in March 1996 and culminated in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. Finally, it implies some of the ways in which
the intergovernmental conference, as a vehicle for constitutional reform,
might in the future be made better adapted to its task.
By their very nature, the IGCs serve as constant reminders that,
however "constitutive" of supranational entities the constitutive treaties
may be, they are still in their origin nothing but treaties. As a result,
when the time comes to modify the ground rules by which the supranational institutions operate, the Member States return to the source: the
making of international treaties among sovereign states. This will explain many of the characteristic features of the IGCs, starting with the
very secrecy with which they proceed.
I.

SECRECY

Though contemporary constitutional reform ordinarily takes place
in the light (or relative light) of day, this is unlikely to be so in the case
of constitutional reform conducted through international agreement.
Admittedly, the IGCs no longer proceed with quite as much secrecy as
they have in the past. This is due largely to the important role in the
IGCs played by the supranational institutions themselves, as opposed to
the Member States. At the 1996 IGC, certain of the institutions (the
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol25/iss1/5
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Commission, the Parliament and the Court, in particular) had a fairly
strong interest in defining both the issues before the IGC and their institutional positions on those issues.
Ultimately, however, the Member States themselves have the decisive voice; that is the nature of an IGC, however much the institutions
may have been called upon to help prepare it. In the last IGC, as in
those that preceded it, the Member States refrained from making their
initial positions on the issues publicly known; much less did they make
known the extent to which they might be willing to make concessions on
some issues in order to achieve the results they sought on other issues.
To the extent that the IGC is a treaty negotiation among States with
potentially conflicting interests, it is hardly surprising that Member
States keep their proverbial "cards" to their "chest" until the waning
hours of the conference. But it is, at the same time, not particularly
conducive to good constitution-making.
II.

SCOPE

The use of intergovernmental conferences for amending the constitutive treaties also has implications for the sheer scope of debate. By
definition, an IGC may have on its agenda any matter that could plausibly occasion an amendment to, or an extension of, any of the constitutive treaties among the Member States. To be sure, the latest IGC had
the benefit of a report by a Reflection Group whose purpose was precisely to focus attention on the most pressing questions, and that report
in tum was informed by focused reports prepared by each of the different EU institutions. The fact remains that the Member States were able
to, and did, place on the IGC agenda any and all items that they deemed
desirable to address through treaty amendment. This makes for a conference of practically limitless possibilities.
The failure to delineate the issues before an IGC presents the participants with a number of problems. First, it raises a problem of resources, since participants simply cannot muster the energies that due
attention to all the potential and actual agenda items requires. Second, it
raises a problem of expectations, since it generates unrealistic ambitions
about the scope and scale of constitutional reform that can reasonably be
expected to emerge at the end of the IGC. The problem of expectations
affects not only the IGC participants, but the public more broadly. Finally, the notion that virtually everything is negotiable or re-negotiable
at an intergovernmental conference creates a problem of impermanence.
Although this is largely a problem of appearances, it is a problem nonePublished by SURFACE, 1998
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theless, for it fosters the idea that nothing (repeated references to the
acquis communautaire notwithstanding) is fixed and durable.
In each of these respects, a comparison with constitutional amendment in the United States, while not entirely fair, is nevertheless revealing. Among the reasons why the constitutional amendment process
in the U.S. is so manageable is that debates leading to amendments are
invariably based upon a precise and focused text relating to one or more
discrete public issues. Thus, by their nature, amendment proposals raise
neither the resource, expectations nor impermanence problems that attend the EU' s intergovernmental conferences. To put the matter differently, Member States truly approach the IGCs more as if they were
periodic constitutional conventions than occasions for successive constitutional amendments, and doing so exacts a price.
Consequently, at the end of the day, IGCs have tended to produce
widely disparate sets of treaty amendments, some elements of which
doubtless deserved fuller and more public debate than, under the circumstances, they could possibly receive. The 1996 IGC was no exception.
Alongside some fairly technical changes (e.g., alteration of the final step
in the parliamentary co-decision procedure for legislation4 ) and the addition of some uncontroversial substantive chapters (e.g., the new chapter
on unemployment5 ), the Amsterdam Treaty contains some breathtakingly important and innovative material. Despite their rather innocuous
title, for example, the new provisions for "enhanced cooperation" 6 open
up dramatic possibilities for a "two-or-more-speed" Europe and all that
that entails. So, too, do the new procedures by which Member States
may be sanctioned for committing persistent breaches of fundamental
Community law principles. 7
It may be that the time has arrived for the European Union to convene intergovernmental conferences around a smaller number of reasonably well-defined issues-preferably with a specific text dealing with
those issues, and only those issues, on the table. This is one way in
which they might better overcome the resources, expectations and impermanence problems that they have generated. It is also a way in
which the States and institutions might ensure that reforms on the table
(particularly those ultimately adopted) receive the careful consideration
they deserve.
4. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, amending EC TREATY, art. 189b.
5. Id., adding a new Title Via to the EC TREATY, consisting of arts. 109n-109s, (on
employment).
6. Id., adding a new Title Via, arts. K.15-K.17, to the TEU, and a new art. 5a to the EC
TREATY.
7. Id., adding art. F.1 to the TEU.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol25/iss1/5
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INSTITUTIONAL EMPHASIS

At the same time, amending the constitutive treaties by intergovernmental conference would seem to risk giving political issues undue priority, at the expense of basic institutional questions. Certainly, in the
U.S. experience, constitutional debates and documents have had a distinctly institutional focus. Not surprisingly for a product of its age, the
U.S. Constitution is in fact heavily institutional in orientation, and subsequent amendments (even the Bill of Rights notwithstanding) have not
fundamentally altered that. U.S. constitutionalism proceeds very largely
on the belief that what is essential about constitutional government is
basic confidence in the institutions in whose hands political decisions
will inevitably come to rest, and confidence in the processes by which
those institutions go about their business.
In fact, the risk that I have identified does not seem as such to have
materialized in the EU setting. Every recent IGC has had a major institutional dimension, with the result that the treaty amendments that followed have themselves had an important institutional component. Once
again, the 1996 IGC is no exception. Its consolidation of the EC legislative process into a fairly unitary one, based upon the principles of parliamentary co-decision, 8 is a good example. Not only is this consolidation
desirable from the point of view of procedural simplicity and transparency, but it goes a long way to removing incentives for the institutions themselves to manipulate the "legal basis" on which measures are
proposed and adopted, or for Member States to mount judicial challenges to the "legal basis" of the measure that is ultimately enacted. 9
Although the intergovernmental character of the amendment process has not in fact diverted institutional issues from the IGC agenda, it
can nevertheless affect the way in which those issues are treated. There
is no other way to explain the failure of the 1996 IGC to resolve such
obviously pressing institutional questions as the size and composition of
the European Commission after enlargement, or the re-weighting of
votes in qualified majority decisionmaking. These issues go to the heart
of the EC legislative process, and appeared to be ones that the IGC simply could not fail to resolve-as it in fact did.
IV.

SUBSTANTIVE LAW GROWTH

Intergovernmental conferences have varied widely in the extent to
which they considered adding new substantive chapters to the constitu8. Id., amending various articles of the EC TREATY.
9. See generally, GEORGE A. BERMANN, ET AL., CASES
MUNITY LAW 84-90 (1993).
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tive treaties, and thus new competences to the European Union. The
1996 IGC distinguished itself from immediately prior ones by adding
only lightly to the existing competences. While earlier treaty amendments had given the institutions new legislative powers over environmental policy, occupational safety and health, consumer protection,
social policy, education, vocational training, and culture-among many
other subjects 10-the Amsterdam Treaty only added employment to the
competences of the Union. 11
This slowdown in the expansion of European Community competences is to be welcomed. Looking at the treaties as they stand, there is
certainly nothing conspicuously absent from the substantive chapters of
the treaties that cannot be adequately explained or justified. In any case,
Articles 1OOa and 235 of the EC Treaty give the institutions ample
means for filling any major gaps. Moreover, any further proliferation of
separate chapters risks impairing the unity and coherence of which the
treaties have such evident need.
Quite apart from any commitment to the principle of subsidiarity, 12
I believe that the European Union would do well to demonstrate that
constitutional progress does not necessitate the expansion of the Union's
legislative jurisdiction. Aside from the fact that expansion is not necessarily progress, it is unrealistic, and ultimately unhealthy, to expect that
every few years and every successive IGC will bring in their wake a
conspicuous subject matter expansion of the EU. Thus, the Amsterdam
Treaty has the merit of not adding substantially to the Union's existing
competences and of showing that an IGC does not have to add new
substantive chapters to the treaties, or else be counted as a failure. A
consolidation of gains is every bit as worthy a constitutional project as
an extension of the outer bounds of legislative competence. Not to derive that lesson from this IGC will set the Member States and institutions up for inevitable disappointment in the years ahead.

10. These chapters were largely added to the EC Treaty by provisions of the Single European Act, Jun. 29, 1987, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA] and the
TEU.
11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
12. EC TREATY art. 3b. "In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community." Id.
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UNFINISHED BUSINESS

If a perpetual extension of power is neither necessary nor even
good for the European Union, progress of another kind is very much in
order. If we look back on the last forty years, and the last several IGCs,
we cannot help but observe that certain basic and quite "constitutional"
achievements within the grasp of the European Union still remain to be
made. These omissions are all the more striking in light of the substantial efforts that were made in the run up to the 1996 IGC to ensure that
these very achievements did not remain undone.
While a respectable constitution can certainly fail to deal with questions such as the "legal personality" of the political entity and "the hierarchy of legal norms" (note that the U.S. Constitution largely fails to do
so in both respects), these issues figured prominently in discussions
leading up to the 1996 IGC, and legal scholars had invested considerable
effort in their resolution. The silence of the Amsterdam Treaty on these
scores is, to that extent, cause for disappointment.
But if constitutional resolution of these issues can be considered
something of a luxury, the resolution of other such issues cannot. Yet
they, too, remain unaddressed. Of these, let me mention two.
The first is the issue of the so-called simplification and consolidation of the treaties. By any standard, the constitutive treaties are a complicated set of texts, both in the way in which they relate to one another
and in their own terms. Judged by the standards of a constitution (which
they admittedly are not), they simply do not measure up. It is difficult to
believe that the European Union would not be strengthened, at least in
the eyes of the public in whose interest it was established and on whose
allegiance it depends, if the treaties constituting the Communities and
the Union were made architecturally simpler and substantively more coherent. In at least this respect, they could readily stand to be "constitutionalized". It is certainly not the case that inadequate preparatory work
had been done on this front.
Still more conspicuous in its absence from the constitutive treaties
is a straightforward expression of fundamental human rights. Observers
of Community law are only too aware of the efforts the Court of Justice
has made through its case law to fill the gap in individual rights protections; it has found support for these efforts in the European Human
Rights Convention (to which every Member State is currently a party)
and in the common "constitutional traditions" of the Member States
themselves.1 3 But, in light of the Union's far-reaching legal powers,
13. See generally

Published by SURFACE, 1998

BERMANN, ET AL.,

supra note 9, at 142-49.

7

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 25, No. 1 [1998], Art. 5

68

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 25:61

inclusion of a human rights charter in the body of the constitutive treaties themselves is by no means too much to expect, and would in fact go
far toward strengthening the Union's political legitimacy. Despite demands by the Parliament, the support of the Commission and urgings by
a number of Member States, this too-after several comprehensive
IGCs-remains undone. 14
With respect to issues of this order-legal personality, hierarchy of
legal norms, simplification and consolidation, and human rights-it may
be less important how they are handled than that they are handled, once
and for all. These are not issues that a mature legal system should
chronically revisit, IGC after IGC. At some point surely arrived at by
now, they should be taken out of the political arena and become more or
less constitutionally resolved.
Although it would clearly be appropriate to have addressed these
issues constitutionally by now, the drafters of the Amsterdam Treaty
chose instead to address constitutionally once again the issue of subsidiarity. A special protocol to the treaty records the Member States'
understanding of what the subsidiarity principle means and how, at least
in some ways, it is to be enforced. 15 However, even a cursory examination of the protocol will show that the drafters thereby added little to our
understanding of either the meaning or workings of subsidiarity. Nor is
it realistic to suppose that the drafters could have done much better than
they did. One can only conclude that, however little clarity in understanding subsidiarity this exercise has brought, it was considered politically indispensable in many, if not most, of the Member States. In this,
too, we observe the powerful effects of intergovemmentalism in the constitutional reform of the European Union.
The Member States do not need to abandon the intergovernmental
conference as the favored mechanism of constitutional reform at the European level. But they do have some choice as to quantity and quality of
matters for discussion, as to the degree of focus, as to the ways in which
the conference is prepared and conducted, and as to the emphasis to be
given to the various issues competing for attention. The choices made
will depend not only the effectiveness of the individual IGCs and their
treaty results, but also the legitimacy and public standing of the entire
enterprise.
14. According to a recent judicial opinion of the Court of Justice, even accession of the
European Union to the European Human Rights Convention would require an amendment of the
EC Treaty and the other constitutive treaties. See In re the Accession of the Community to the
European Human Rights Convention, Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996).
15. Protocol (to the Treaty of Amsterdam) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1.
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